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Introduction
The Ethereum blockchain network is a decentralized platform enabling smart contract 
execution and transactions of Ether (ETH) [1], its designated cryptocurrency. Ethereum is the 
second most popular cryptocurrency with a market cap of more than 100 billion USD, with 
hundreds of thousands of transactions executed daily by hundreds of thousands of unique 
wallets. Tens of thousands of those wallets are newly generated each day.  
The Ethereum platform enables anyone to freely open multiple new wallets [2] free of charge 
(resulting in a large number of wallets that are controlled by the same entities). This attribute 
makes the Ethereum network a breeding space for activity by software robots (bots). The 
existence of bots is widespread in different digital technologies and there are various 
approaches to detect their activity such as rule-base, clustering, machine learning and more 
[3,4]. In this work we demonstrate how bot detection can be implemented using a network 
theory approach.  
A Network Theory Approach
Being a platform used for human interactions, the Ethereum network can be described and 
modeled by a Network Theory approach. The degree distribution of such networks, for 
example, often displays a power law distribution [5]. This phenomenon can also be observed 
when constructing a network that represents Ethereum transactions between wallets—where 
each wallet is a vertex and a transaction between two wallets is an edge. (Fig. 1)  
Fig. 1
Previous research has demonstrated that time differences between consecutive events in many 
human activities display a power law distribution. This phenomenon is displayed in waiting time 
for call centers and e-mail communication [6] as well as in pausing time between transactions 
in a USD/DEM exchange [7]. In this work, we ask whether the time difference between 
consecutive Ethereum transactions demonstrates a power law distribution as well. 
The time difference between consecutive transactions in this work refer to the number of 
minutes between every transaction and its prior transaction. The time difference was 
calculated for the transactions of each wallet separately, and we created a histogram from the 
time difference of all the transactions of all wallets in the Ethereum network. The histogram 
shows that, indeed, the time difference between consecutive transactions demonstrates a 
power law distribution. (Fig. 2) 
Every bin in the distribution contains a group of wallets which have made two consecutive 
transactions with the same time difference. It can be observed that the distribution of time 
differences between the consecutive transactions of all Ethereum wallets does not perfectly fit 
the power law model and is characterized by multiple spikes. Anomalies from the power law 
model in human behavior networks might represent the occurrence of potentially interesting 
events [8]. We can clearly distinguish between two types of anomalies:  
Periodic anomalies: Anomalies consisting of a specific time difference which repeats itself in 
any random sample of a fixed time range. For example, when sampling a period of two days 
beginning at any random date and time, there will be a spike at the time difference of 24 hours. 
(Fig. 3a) The same spike will appear when sampling any random period of one week. In a one-
week period, there are additional repeated spikes at a time difference of 48, 72, 96, 120 and 
144 hours. (Fig. 3b) Analyzing the transactions which created these spikes reveals that many 
of the transactions were executed by mining pools distributing mining reward to pool members 
(mining pools are groups of users sharing their processing power in order to compete for the 
right to generate a block and win the mining reward [2]).  
Fig. 2
    
Fig. 3a: An arbitrary two days sample    Fig. 3b: An arbitrary one-week sample 
Irregular anomalies: Anomalies consisting of a specific time difference, taking place only at a 
particular time period. For instance, displayed in Fig. 4 we can find a spike at a time difference 
of 1032 minutes (17 hours), observed on May 18, 2018 only. Analyzing the wallets whose 
transactions create these irregular spikes, we found that they took part in token Airdrops—a 
distribution of free tokens [9]. By creating many unique wallets and participating in an Airdrop, 
one entity can collect a large number of tokens. Such wallet activity is usually executed by 
bots. The presence of non-human activity provides an explanation for observed behavioral 
patterns which deviate from the power law model.  
   
Fig. 4 – One day sample at May 18, 2018. The spike is similar to the periodic spikes,  
but it appears at the time difference of 1032m only this specific day.  
Conclusion
Each spike in both types of anomalies represents a collection of highly correlated wallets which 
deviate from the expected power law distribution rather than resembling spontaneous human 
activity. In some cases, anomalies from the power law model in human interaction networks 
may be evidence for emergency events [10]. In this case, we assume that transactions which 
are anomalous to the power law model represent non-human behavior executed by bots. This 
assumption is based on the nature of the anomalies (spikes occurring at a very specific time 
difference) and on the observation of other properties common to the anomalous transactions, 
such as having the same transaction value or the same destination wallet. Using a network 
theory approach, analyzing the distribution of time differences between consecutive 
transactions enables us to detect non-human activity.  
References
1. V. Buterin et al., “A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform,” white 
paper, 2014. 
2. Dannen, C. (2017). Introducing Ethereum and Solidity. Berkeley: Apress. 
3. Gu, G., Perdisci, R., Zhang, J., & Lee, W. (2008). Botminer: Clustering analysis of network traffic for 
protocol-and structure-independent botnet detection. 
4. Wang, A. H. (2010, June). Detecting spam bots in online social networking sites: a machine 
learning approach. In IFIP Annual Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy (pp. 
335-342). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
5. Callaway, D. S., Newman, M. E., Strogatz, S. H., & Watts, D. J. (2000). Network robustness and 
fragility: Percolation on random graphs. Physical review letters, 85(25), 5468. 
6. Barabasi, A. L. (2005). The origin of bursts and heavy tails in human dynamics. Nature, 435(7039), 
207. 
7. Masoliver, J., Montero, M., & Weiss, G. H. (2003). Continuous-time random-walk model for financial 
distributions. Physical Review E, 67(2), 021112. 
8. Akoglu, L., McGlohon, M., & Faloutsos, C. (2010, June). Oddball: Spotting anomalies in weighted 
graphs. In Pacific-Asia Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (pp. 410-421). 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
9. Howell, S. T., Niessner, M., & Yermack, D. (2018). Initial coin offerings: Financing growth with 
cryptocurrency token sales (No. w24774). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
10. Bagrow, J. P., Wang, D., & Barabasi, A. L. (2011). Collective response of human populations to 
large-scale emergencies. PloS one, 6(3), e17680.
